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Introduction
In explaining the monetary transmission mechanism, attention has gener-
ally focused on the interest rate channel which works by affecting the cost
of capital via changes in real interest rates. However, the validity of the
interest rate channel has been questioned as the money demand function
has become unstable in the wake of the process of financial reform and
deregulation since the 1980s.
Accordingly, greater attention has been paid to the other channels
through which monetary policy is transmitted. These include, in partic-
ular, the credit channel centring on changes in the volume of bank lending
and in net worth, the exchange rate channel and the channels which
operate through other asset prices.
It has become a pressing task for the central bank to make an accurate
assessment of the impact of changes in monetary policy on the real
sector, such as the time lags and the magnitudes involved, by gaining a
better understanding of the interaction between the financial and the real
sector. This necessitates a clearer specification of the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism.
In this context, the present paper, after outlining the chief charac-
teristics of the various transmission channels, analyses the monetary
transmission mechanism in Korea on the basis of the findings of recent
empirical studies of the credit channel.
1. Theoretical underpinnings of the credit channel
The credit view contends that two channels of monetary transmission
arise due to informational asymmetries between borrowers and lenders
in financial markets. The bank lending channel emphasises the special role
of bank loans, particularly for “bank-dependent” borrowers (e.g. small
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firms), while the balance-sheet channel operates through the balance-
sheet positions of business firms.
The bank lending channel rests on the idea that small firms, facing
informational frictions in financial markets, must rely primarily on bank
loans for external finance because it is prohibitively expensive for these
borrowers to issue securities in the open market. When bank loans are of
special importance for bank-dependent small firms, the effects of a mone-
tary contraction may be amplified through the following two channels
beyond those working through the interest rate channel: the direct
channel operates through the reduced willingness of banks to lend at
the going market interest rates owing to institutional factors such as
regulatory action and moral suasion to restrain bank lending directly. This
channel is direct because it does not depend on the extent to which
market interest rates rise. The indirect channel becomes operative when
the increase in market interest rates following a monetary contraction
raises loan rates enough both to cover the increase in lenders’ cost of
funds as a result of the higher interest rates and to compensate them for
the higher default risk. Banks also tend to tighten other non-price terms
of lending, such as collateral requirements and the maturity of loans
(Morgan (1992)). When either of these two bank lending channels oper-
ates, the banks are forced to reduce their total lending, and in most cases
small firms which rely primarily on banks for credit must curtail their
spending on investment.
Kashyap and Stein (1994) argue that banking firms may be subject to
the same sort of capital market imperfections as their non-financial coun-
terparts. According to their view, if a bank lending channel is effective, a
monetary contraction should have a disproportionately large impact on
the lending behaviour of small banks, which are more likely to experience
difficulties offsetting a loss of reserves by expanding non-deposit sources
of external finance. Consequently, they wish to cut loan supply by rela-
tively more than do large banks.
The balance-sheet channel of monetary policy transmission arises
because rising interest rates, following the adoption of a tight monetary
policy, directly increase the interest expenses of those non-financial firms
which rely heavily on short-term debt to finance inventories and working
capital, reducing their net cash flows and weakening their financial posi-
tions. Furthermore, rising interest rates are also associated with falling
asset prices, which indirectly erode the value of the firms’ collateral.
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These effects lead to a reduction in the firms’ net worth, thereby raising
the premium for external finance (the wedge between the cost of funds
raised externally and the opportunity cost of internal funds). Small
borrowers such as small firms are most likely to face a proportionately
larger premium for external finance. One possible reason for this is that
small borrowers have proportionately smaller collateralisable net worth.
Therefore, small firms that have relatively poor access to short-term
credit markets respond to the deteriorated balance-sheet positions
principally by drawing down inventories and by cutting investment
spending more than large firms.
It is worth emphasising that the credit channels provide support for an
asymmetric effect of monetary policy: the sharpest differences in financing
and investment behaviour between large and small firms arise mainly in
tight-money periods and in recessions, thereby serving to amplify the
impact of monetary policy on real spending and real activity that could be
predicted via the interest rate channel.
2. An empirical study of the effectiveness of the bank lending
channel in Korea
In the following section, we present a summary of the findings of recent
research analysing the case for the existence of a bank lending channel in
the transmission of monetary policy in Korea.
(i) Identification issue
In order to identify a special role played by the bank lending channel in
monetary policy transmission, it is important to correctly identify
whether a reduction in bank lending following a tightening of monetary
policy is largely the consequence of an inward shift in loan supply, rather
than just an inward shift in loan demand. The identification problem boils
down to the following question: can the central bank reduce the loan
supply of banks merely by draining reserves?
Two rather convincing approaches to addressing the identification
problem have been put forward in recent years.
First, Kashyap and Stein (1995) analyse cross-sectional differences in
financing and lending decisions of banks of different size. They argue that
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the relative movements in loan volumes and securities holdings across
large and small banks may be able to provide useful information for iden-
tifying the loan supply effects – small banks’ supply schedule shifts in by
more when the central bank tightens its stance. Their analysis provides
the following testable predictions: if both the volume of lending and the
securities holdings of small banks decline more rapidly in response to a
given contraction of reserves (deposits) than do those of large banks, the
effects of a monetary contraction would be transmitted to the real
economy through the lending channel, largely via the dampening effects
on the loan supply behaviour of small banks.1 This sort of identification of
the loan supply effects rests on the idea that banking firms may also face
the same sort of capital market imperfections as their non-financial coun-
terparts. The intuitive case for the loan supply effects is as follows. A
tightening of monetary policy should cause small banks to cut their loan
supply by relatively more than large banks, reflecting the hypothesis that
small banks face higher costs in attracting non-deposit sources of external
finance to make up the funding shortfall.
Secondly, an alternative approach involves identifying independent
monetary shocks on the basis of evidence derived from historical records.
The central element of this “narrative approach” is to isolate periods of
tight monetary policy when the central bank clearly shifts to an active
policy of trying to reduce aggregate demand and bring down inflation
(Romer and Romer (1989 and 1990)). The next step involves examining
whether tight monetary policy following negative shocks causes lower
output through a decline in bank loans.
(ii) Test for the existence of the bank lending channel using disaggregated
bank data
We now focus on testing the theoretical predictions of the loan supply
effects discussed above. Does the asset side (loan volume and securities
holdings) of small banks shrink more in response to a monetary contrac-
tion than that of large banks? We tested the implication using the impulse
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1 For a more detailed discussion of the theoretical implication, see Kashyap and Stein
(1995). Most notably, the identification of loan supply effects requires that loan demand facing
small banks has to be sufficiently inelastic. It is likely that this requirement is satisfied in practice
in Korea. Since small banks in Korea, compared with large banks, tend to lend to smaller, more
recession-sensitive customers who rely heavily on bank loans for external funds, the loan
demand curve facing them is likely to be inelastic in terms of changes in loan interest rates.
responses of the standard Vector Auto Regression (VAR). The VAR
approach was applied to monthly Korean data for four time series vari-
ables from January 1987 to May 1994. The monetary base was chosen
to proxy for changes in the stance of monetary policy (monetary policy
indicator). The industrial production index and the consumer price index
(CPI) were selected to proxy for the real sector variables. We followed
Kashyap and Stein (1995) by dividing banks on the basis of their total
assets into “small and medium-sized” and “large” categories that reflect
differences in their cost of raising external funds. In our case, given data
insufficiency, the six largest commercial banks were classified as banks in
the “large” category and the other commercial banks and ten local banks
as banks in the “small and medium-sized” category.2 Furthermore, one
class of primary assets (bank loans, cash and securities holdings) of each
bank group was considered in the VAR analysis. Data used were loga-
rithms of the nominal, seasonally adjusted, level data of all variables
considered. Graph 1 provides a graphical illustration, tracing the impulse
responses of loan volumes and securities holdings for banks in each
category (large banks, small and medium-sized banks) to one negative
standard deviation shock to the monetary base.
The impulse responses shown in Graph 1 indicate that a 1% decrease
in the monetary base seems to have a much greater dampening effect on
the lending volume and the securities holdings of small and medium-sized
banks, as well as of the local banks alone, than on those of the six largest
banks.3 We interpret this evidence as being consistent with the prediction
of the lending channel. The finding that the loan volume of smaller banks
shrinks more in the wake of a monetary contraction may reflect the
following tendency: since smaller banks tend to rely heavily on deposits
for fund-raising and face higher borrowing costs compared with large
banks, they appear to cut their lending volume (loan supply) by a relatively
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2 Small and medium-sized banks include ten local banks and the following eight nationwide
commercial banks, excluding the six largest: Shinhan Bank (established in 1982), KorAm Bank
(established in 1983), Donghwa Bank (established in 1989), Dongnam Bank (established in 1989),
Daedong Bank (established in 1989), Hana Bank (established in 1991), Boram Bank (established in
1991), Peace Bank of Korea (established in 1992). Note that due to lack of data our estimates are
restricted to the period from January 1987 to May 1995.
3 It is the case in Korea that preferential access of small and medium-sized firms to bank
credit at subsidised rates has been relatively easier at small and medium-sized local banks than at
large banks. Interestingly, this practice seems in line with the theoretical requirement that needs
to be satisfied for the bank lending channel to work well, namely that the loan demand facing
small banks has to be sufficiently inelastic.
greater extent than large banks do. Most notably, smaller banks are
shown to attract external funds by resorting to larger issuance of CDs at
a rather high interest rate cost, while they have comparatively lesser
recourse to borrowing from the Bank of Korea and to foreign currency
borrowings at low interest rates. As a result, it seems likely that smaller
banks incur higher borrowing costs.
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Graph 1
Changes in lending volume, securities and cash holdings 
following a reduction in the reserve base
— — — Large banks – – – Local banks ········· All small and medium-sized banks
(%) Change in lending volume
(months)
(months)
(%) Change in securities and cash holdings
(iii) Test for the existence of the bank lending channel on the basis of the
narrative approach
The central goal in this section is to provide a detailed examination of
whether the focal episodes of tight monetary policy, identified by a narra-
tive approach, caused the bank lending channel to play a distinctive role in
amplifying the real effects of general tightening (Romer and Romer (1989
and 1990)). To this end, we conducted the following empirical tests.
First, we identified a sequence of four focal episodes of monetary
contraction since the second half of the 1970s in which the Bank of Korea
appeared to have deliberately been willing to accept output sacrifices to
reduce inflation (anti-inflationary policy), around the time when business
booms were peaking. Like Romer and Romer (1989 and 1990), we identi-
fied the focal episodes of monetary contraction on the basis of the main
shifts in the policy stance of the Bank of Korea and on the basis of infor-
mation from the historical trend of all available financial variables,
including the growth rates of the monetary base, total reserves, M2 and
bank loans; movements in interest rates; and the gap between the
targeted growth rate of M2 and its actual rate. We thus selected four
focal episodes of restrictive monetary policy: August 1978, October 1983,
May 1984 and March 1990.4 We then estimated the effects of the general
tightening after each focal episode of restrictive monetary policy on the
monetary base, M2 and bank loans.
Secondly, if monetary policy is indeed a relatively more important
source of output fluctuations in the focal episodes than at normal times,
and if monetary policy affects output through the lending channel as well,
we would expect the effects of bank lending on output to be stronger in
the focal episodes than at other times. Thus we tested for the implication.
To assess whether the effects of monetary contraction take place in
the focal episodes, we proceeded as follows. We first regressed, from
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4 It could be pointed out that the focal episodes of restrictive monetary policy in this
analysis were not selected solely on the basis of the official policy statements on the part of the
Bank of Korea. Since there were no appropriate official statements available which could provide
useful information for selecting with sufficient precision the focal episodes of monetary tight-
ening, we instead relied on the historical trends of major financial variables, including monetary
aggregates and short-term interest rates. To this end, before selecting each focal episode of
monetary contraction, we verified whether the movements of these financial variables around
the focal episodes as initially identified on the basis of major shifts in the policy stance of the Bank
of Korea (such as a rapid increase in the reserve requirement ratio and official statements
signalling the Bank’s intention of bringing inflationary pressures down) were largely due to a
monetary tightening.
January 1970 up to the month just before each episode, the monthly
change in the logarithm of the monetary base on 12 own lags in a
univariate forecast equation 1, and the monthly change in the logarithm of
M2 (and the logarithm of bank loans) on 16 own lags, the contempora-
neous value and eight lags and eight leads of the change in the logarithm of
industrial production, as shown respectively in equations 2 and 3.5
12
DInRBt = a + S biDInRBt–i (1)i=1
16 8
DInMt = a + S biDInMt–i + S ciDInYt–i (2)i=1 i= –8
16 8
DInLt = a + S biDInLt–i + S ciDInYt–i (3)i=1 i= –8
where RB is the monetary base, M is M2, Y is the industrial production
index, and L is bank loans. Note that a monthly dummy (D) for restrictive
monetary policy was included (although not shown) in all equations and
that they were estimated by OLS. We then used the actual paths of
money (monetary base, M2) and bank lending up to the month before
each focal episode and the estimated coefficients from those equations
to construct dynamic forecasts of the paths of money and bank lending
over the next 24 months. We cumulated the predicted changes to obtain
forecasts for the levels of money and bank lending, finding the resulting
forecast errors. If the cumulative forecasting errors (cumulative forecasts
minus actual values) for money and lending are negative soon after the
shift to an anti-inflationary policy, money and bank lending may be said to
have fallen as a result of tight monetary policy after the individual focal
episodes.
The plotting of the monetary base shown in Graph 2 indicates that the
forecast errors for individual episodes as well as their average over the
four episodes are consistently negative and their absolute values continue
to increase over the forecasting period. The analogous forecast errors for
M2 and bank lending, as shown in Graph 3, also indicate patterns that are
quite similar to those for the monetary base. Note in particular that the
deviations of actual lending from its predicted path are greater on average
than the movements in the average forecast errors for M2. Our findings
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5 The reason that we estimated the univariate forecast equation of the monetary base was
to reflect Schwartz’s comment that the best indicator of the central bank’s actions is the growth
of high-powered money (Schwartz (1989)).
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Graph 2
Accumulated forecasting errors in reserve money following
focal points of monetary tightening
Date of monetary tightening:
August 1978
Date of monetary tightening:
October 1983
Date of monetary tightening:
May 1984
Date of monetary tightening:
March 1990
Average accumulated forecasting error of reserve money
(months)
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Graph 3
Accumulated forecasting errors in M2 and bank lending
following focal points of monetary tightening
—— M2 – – – Bank lending
Date of monetary tightening:
August 1978
Date of monetary tightening:
October 1983
Date of monetary tightening:
May 1984
Date of monetary tightening:
March 1990
Average accumulated forecasting errors of M2 and bank lending
(months)
strongly suggest that the individual focal episodes we identified repre-
sented important monetary shocks and that the bank lending channel
played a crucial role in the monetary transmission mechanism.
We now turn to the question of whether the strengths of the
money/output and lending/output relationships are different in response
to independent shifts in monetary policy than at other times (Romer and
Romer (1990)). To address this question, we first considered the regres-
sions of output on money (M2) and on bank lending (equations 4 and 5),
using a “St. Louis”-like equation.
16 16 4
DInYt = a + S biDInYt–i + S ciDInMt–i + S diDti (4)i=1 i=0 i=1
16 16 4
DInYt = a + S biDInYt–i + S ciDInLt–i + S diDti (5)i=1 i=0 i=1
where Y, L and M are the same as in equations 1 to 3 and monthly
dummies (D) for restrictive monetary policy are included in each equa-
tion. We first estimated equations 4 and 5 without dummies (D) by OLS
and then estimated each equation with dummies (D) by two-stage least
squares, instrumenting with the current and lagged values of a dummy
that is equal to one during each of the four focal episodes in which we
identify shifts to restrictive monetary policy. The next step is to show the
dynamic responses of industrial production (Y) to money (M) or bank
lending (L) implied by the OLS and IV estimates of the money/output or
lending/output regressions.6 We then need to compare the OLS and two-
stage least squares (IV) estimates of equations 4 and 5 to examine the
relative strength of the estimated relationships between money (or bank
lending) and output. Note that the OLS estimates of equation 4 simply
summarise the usual money/output relations, whereas the IV estimates
summarise the relationship between movements in output and the
average deviation of money from its usual behaviour in the focal episodes.
Again, analogous comments apply to the difference of the OLS and IV
estimates of the lending/output relationship. As just discussed, if we allow
for the possibility that monetary policy affects output not only through
money but also through bank lending, and if monetary policy is a relatively
more important source of output fluctuations in the focal episodes than at
other times, it may be the case that the tightened monetary policy in the
150
6 For example, the response of M to Y at period zero is c0 . The period one response is
c0+(b1c0+c1). The period two response is c0+(b1c0+c1)+b1(b1c0+c1)+b2c0+c2; and so on.
focal episodes would cause the IV estimates to imply a weaker impact of
money on output than the OLS estimates. In contrast, we may expect the
IV estimates of the lending/output relationships to be stronger than the
OLS estimates.
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Graph 4
Changes in M2 and bank lending and their resulting impact on
industrial production
Bank lending volume
(months)
—— OLS - - - IV
—— OLS - - - IV
Aggregate money stock (M2)
(months)
Source: Bernanke, Ben S. (1993), “Credit in the Macroeconomy”, Quarterly.
Graph 4 presents the results of the OLS and IV estimates of equations
4 and 5. The top panel shows that the IV estimates of the impact of bank
lending on industrial production are much larger than the OLS estimates
at all horizons. However, as shown in the bottom panel, the responses of
industrial production to money (M2) using the IV estimates are somewhat
lower than those obtained using the OLS estimates. These results
strongly support the view that bank lending has played an important inde-
pendent role in amplifying the real effects of policy tightening implied by
the interest rate channel in the major episodes of restrictive monetary
policy since the second half of the 1970s.
3. Conclusions
As our empirical findings indicate, at times of tight monetary policy, banks
(especially small and medium-sized banks) tend to reduce the volume of
bank loans either in response to credit controls of the central bank,7 or to
moral suasion, or at their own discretion. This convincingly suggests that
the effects of monetary policy tightening are transmitted to the real
economy not only through the interest rate channel but also through the
lending channel. If this is the case, the following policy implication may be
derived: a tightening of monetary policy can have a greater-than-expected
impact on aggregate economic activity (e.g. on investment behaviour)
through the lending channel, with market interest rates rising more than
would have been expected. In this respect, the real effects of a tightening
of monetary policy may be amplified beyond what would be predicted by
considering only the interest rate channel.
To make an accurate assessment of the timing and the magnitude of
the impact of changes in monetary policy on aggregate economic activity
in Korea and to adopt appropriate policy measures, the central bank
needs to gain a better understanding of the transmission mechanism. In
formulating policy, it should monitor an alternative indicator, such as the
volume of bank loans which has shown a close link to aggregate spending,
in addition to the money supply, interest rates and the exchange rate.
Thus, it is desirable for the efficient conduct of monetary policy that
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7 Prior to moving to an indirect control system in December 1988, the Bank of Korea relied
heavily on direct controls whereby it set and enforced bank-by-bank credit ceilings.
the central bank makes active use of the volume of bank lending as an
information variable.
Since a monetary contraction tends to reduce the willingness of banks
to lend, credit allocated to bank-dependent borrowers (small firms) might
decline disproportionately, causing these borrowers to curtail their
investment spending. Policy-makers, including the Bank of Korea, there-
fore need to bear in mind such distributional disadvantages and would
have to take appropriate actions to facilitate steady credit extension to
small firms from a long-term point of view.
The development of substitutes for demand deposits and currency
may lessen the central bank’s ability to control short-term interest rates.
Similarly, as capital market opening proceeds rapidly and derivatives
become more actively used, banks may come to rely heavily on non-
deposit sources of funds, such as certificates of deposit, and on open
market credits. The central bank’s ability to influence the supply of bank
loans through the lending channel may therefore be reduced to a great
extent. Moreover, if derivatives facilitate asset-switching between
different maturities in different currencies, hence producing large changes
in exchange rates, the exchange rate channel of monetary transmission
may be expected to become more important.
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